[NYTr] Loophole in US Efforts to Secure Ports

[nytr at olm.blythe-systems.com]

The New York Times - May 25, 2005
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/25/politics/25ports.html

Loopholes Seen in U.S. Efforts to Secure Ports

By ERIC LIPTON

WASHINGTON, May 24 - The Department of Homeland Security's effort to extend
its antiterrorism campaign overseas by enlisting help from importers and
foreign ports has been so flawed that the program may have made it easier at
times to smuggle unconventional weapons into the United States,
Congressional officials say.

Homeland Security has reduced inspections in the United States of cargo
coming from 36 foreign ports and 5,000 importers that were certified under
its antiterrorism initiatives.  But the department has failed to confirm
whether most of those importers have tightened security or whether thousands
of high-risk containers headed to the United States were inspected at ports
overseas, agency records show.

"We have folks here who have the right intentions," said Senator Norm
Coleman, Republican of Minnesota, chairman of an investigative panel
scheduled to hold an oversight hearing on the programs on Thursday. "But
rather than making it harder for folks with evil intentions to do harm to
this country, we have in place a system that creates the potential for
greater vulnerability."

The port and importer programs, which offer incentives to those who sign on
to Homeland Security initiatives, are intended to help block threats
overseas so they cannot reach American shores, government officials say. But
Kristi M. Clemens, assistant commissioner at Customs and Border Protection -
the division of Homeland Security that set up these efforts - said the
agency realized that the two programs had some problems.

"We have had to make adjustments to further strengthen the program," she
said in an interview on Tuesday. "The criticisms are fine, some of them have
been helpful."

However, Ms. Clemens rejected the suggestion that the programs' weaknesses
had compromised national security. "We are still in a better position with
the programs than we were without it," she said. "We are on the right track.
Are we perfect? No." Customs officials have long recognized that the nine
million ship containers arriving in the United States each year pose a
security risk. Robert C. Bonner, commissioner of Customs and Border
Protection, called the containers "the potential Trojan horse of the 21st
century" in a speech in January.

"A 40-foot container loaded with ammonium nitrate would create a huge blast
10 to 20 times that of the Oklahoma City bombing," he said. "But the sum of
all fears is a 'nuke-in-a-box.' "

Soon after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Customs demanded that 24
hours before a sea shipment leaves a foreign country, carriers must
electronically deliver details on any cargo headed to the United States or
the shipment can automatically be blocked. A special computerized targeting
center in the United States screens all these reports, looking for any
anomalies that might provide a hint that a container holds dangerous goods.
That could include a supplier listed for the first time or a product shipped
through an unusual route.

Until last month, importers enrolled in the Customs incentives program -
known as the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism - were
automatically designated as a lower risk. Containers shipped by them are
inspected once every 306 times, instead of once every 47 times, Customs
officials said, permitting faster movement of goods to warehouses owned by
Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Lowe's and other companies.

Ms. Clemens and Todd Owen, director of the importers' program, acknowledged
that so many businesses enrolled that the agency granted thousands of the
preferential security clearances without determining whether the companies
had improved security measures.  "Trust, don't verify," is the slogan some
critics have given to the program.

About 9,000 applications from importers have been submitted so far. But of
the 5,000 that have been accepted, Customs officials have only verified that
597 companies were taking the required measures. Those include such steps as
putting up fencing around manufacturing plants and watching over loaded
containers as they move from the factory to the ship, Mr.  Owen said.

"It is very troubling to me," said Senator Susan M. Collins, a Maine
Republican who is chairwoman of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee. "If in fact it is a hollow program, then oddly enough that
increases our vulnerability."

Late last month, after the Government Accountability Office and members of
Congress raised questions about the practice, Customs retracted some of the
preferred treatment for more than 4,000 importers until verification efforts
are complete. Customs is also moving quickly to hire more auditors, going
from a staff of 40 last year to about 100, with plans to add more soon.

The foreign ports program, has less severe but still troubling weaknesses,
members of Congress and shipping experts say. Ports enrolled in the program
must agree to set up scanning equipment that can look inside containers to
see whether any suspicious items might be hidden in loads that the targeting
center deems "high risk." In return, cargo from those ports are moved more
quickly once they land in the United States.

Customs sends four of its own inspectors to the overseas ports to help
supervise the handling of cargo, a tiny number given the size of these giant
ports, including those in Tokyo, Rotterdam or Hong Kong. But as the program
has started up, it at times failed to inspect "high risk" containers before
they were loaded and sailing toward the United States, said Al Gina, the
program's director.

Sometimes, that was because information provided by foreign customs
officials resolved suspicions about a possible threat. But in many other
cases, Customs officials discovered that the containers they wanted to
inspect were already gone. In other cases, counterparts from the host
nations declined to conduct a requested inspection.

Countries with certified ports include Canada, the Netherlands, Germany,
Belgium, France, Sweden, Italy, Britain, Greece, Spain, Singapore, Japan,
South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, China, South Africa
and Argentina.

Since late 2002, when the program started at the first major overseas port,
40,628 containers headed for the United States from participating ports were
deemed high risk.  About 10 percent did not get inspected before they left,
Customs officials said.

The failure to inspect "high risk" containers is only one of the weaknesses
identified by auditors and Congressional investigators.

The requirements for screening equipment and the training of foreign customs
officers who use it are not clear enough, Congressional investigators said.
The Energy Department, which has been moving to put radiation detection
equipment at the world's largest ports, has been too slow to install the
equipment, completing work at only two ports by the end of the last fiscal
year, government auditors said.

And because of flaws in the Customs computer system, agents stationed
overseas had no reliable way of telling counterparts in the United States
when a high-risk container might have left without being checked, a
shortcoming that has since been addressed, officials said. Customs officials
would not provide documentation to show that all of the high-risk containers
not inspected at the foreign ports were checked once they arrived in the
United States. But they said they were reasonably confident the checks had
been made.

Copyright 2005 The New York Times